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ABSTRACT
In the last four years, the number of distinct autonomous vehicles
platforms deployed in the streets of California increased 6-fold,
while the reported accidents increased 12-fold. is can become
a trend with no signs of subsiding as it is fueled by a constant
stream of innovations in hardware sensors and machine learning
soware. Meanwhile, if we expect the public and regulators to trust
the autonomous vehicle platforms, we need to nd beer ways
to solve the problem of adding technological complexity without
increasing the risk of accidents. We studied this problem from the
perspective of reliability engineering in which a given risk of an
accident has severity and probability of occurring. Timely infor-
mation on accidents is important for engineers to anticipate and
reuse previous failures to approximate the risk of accidents in a new
city. However, this is challenging in the context of autonomous
vehicles because of the sparse nature of data on the operational
scenarios (driving trajectories in a new city). Our approach was to
mitigate data sparsity by reducing the state space through mon-
itoring of multiple-vehicles operations. We then minimized the
risk of accidents by determining proper allocation of tests for each
equivalence class. Our contributions comprise (1) a set of strategies
to monitor the operational data of multiple autonomous vehicles,
(2) a Bayesian model that estimates changes in the risk of accidents,
and (3) a feedback control-loop that minimizes these risks by re-
allocating test eort. Our results are promising in the sense that
we were able to measure and control risk for a diversity of changes
in the operational scenarios. We evaluated our models with data
from two real cities with distinct trac paerns and made the data
available for the community.
1 INTRODUCTION
Aer a promising start at the DARPA competition [3] and extensive
testing in city streets [13], autonomous vehicles started to nally
look reliable. is was a particularly ambitious outlook for a tech-
nology that is so reliant on a constant stream of innovations in
blackbox machine learning models [7] and for which one cannot
fully anticipate all of the operational scenarios for testing [56]. As
a consequence, between the years of 2015 and 2019, the number of
companies testing cars in the streets of California increased six-fold
(from 11 to 65), while the number of accidents increased almost
12-fold (from nine to 104) [18]. Sadly, it was also within this period
that the rst fatal crashes started to happen [42, 53].
e engineering challenge is how to provide safety-critical assur-
ances when the operational scenario changes [5, 9]. e approach
has been to design systems with self-adaptation capabilities [14],
for instance, feedback control-loops [11] and runtime models [58].
ese models provide a principled framework to design complex
adaptive behaviors that allow systems to handle unanticipated
changes in their operational environments. is also implied that
the testing of these systems happens in the presence of adaptions
and the uncertainties in the models that generated them [19, 23, 48].
To mitigate model uncertainties, dierent approaches were pro-
posed for testing self-adaptive systems (SAS) [54], for instance,
robustness testing [8, 25], online testing [26], runtime-based assur-
ance techniques [12], and risk-based testing [50][35].
However, the current state of the art still lacks in terms of guid-
ance to allocate tests when the test evidence is partial, and the input
data is sparse. ese are characteristic of the unanticipated scenar-
ios faced by a SAS operating in a changing environment [5, 9] and
they stem from the fact that tests cannot guarantee the absence of
failures [16] because there is no number of tests that can uncover
all defects in a soware.
Hence, we approach test allocation from the perspective of so-
ware reliability testing [6], which allows estimating the reliability
of soware even when there are no identied failures. [36]. e
approach is based on detecting the failures that might manifest
more frequently according to an operational prole [39]. Intu-
itively, it consists of allocating the tests in a way that mirrors how
the soware might be executed by the end-user [4].
e problem that we focus on is how to nd a test allocation
strategy that minimizes the risk of accidents in a new environment
with sparse data. We partition the problem in two research ques-
tions: (1) how to estimate the risks of accidents before moving to a
new environment, and (2) how well can we mitigate these risks by
properly allocating tests.
Our Approach was based on mitigating data sparsity by reducing
the state space. For that, we systematically identied and moni-
tored equivalence classes of multiple-vehicles operations. We used
these classes to allocate tests in a proportion that minimizes the
risk of accidents. To discover these test allocations, we applied
statistical test methods [22] that measure the risk as a function
of hazard (severity) of a failure and the corresponding reliability
of each equivalence class. By ”reliability”, we mean ”the proba-
bility of failure-free operation in a specied environment over a
dened period of time” [38]. is denition follows the DIN400-41
standard [17] and is widely adopted in the automotive soware
engineering practice [63].
Our contribution is a general four-step methodology (Figure 1)
that works as a template to instantiate dierent self-adaptive strate-
gies (section 4) and comprises two methods:
(1) a monitoring method to mitigate data sparsity by collecting
operational data of multiple autonomous vehicles (System
n Operational Data and Monitor Usage step)
(2) a statistical method to estimate risks (Analyse Usage and
Plan Tests based on the Operational and Test Distribution)
In order to actively pursue risk-based goals, these methods operate
in a feedback control-loop that updates the operational and test
distribution and executes the tests to check the system for failures.
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Figure 1: General methodology
Our results are promising in a sense that we were able to measure
and control risk for a diversity of operational scenarios. To allow
the reproduction of our results, we made the procedures, models,
and data publicly available to the community.
We structured the paper as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the example scenario and corresponding architecture. In Section
3 we explain the preliminaries that are the foundations of our
approach. Our approach is then detailed in Section 4, followed by
the solution of optimization problems in Section 5, evaluated in
Section 6, and discussed in Section 7. In Section 8 we position our
contributions with respect to other related work. Finally, in Section
9, we summarize our contributions and future work.
2 EXAMPLE SCENARIO AND
ARCHITECTURE
e scenario and corresponding architecture introduce the basic
intuitions about the actors and the objects involved in the self-
adaptation of the autonomous vehicle’s operations. ese deni-
tions will later be used to derive the statistical models and to plan
their empirical evaluations.
2.1 Architecture
In our scenario, self-adaptive systems will be represented by au-
tonomous vehicles. e soware architecture for the vehicle is a
version of the decision-making hierarchy described in [45] (Figure
2, le). Since we focus on self-adaptive systems, we transferred the
decision-making hierarchy into a two-layered architecture (Figure
2, right) with an adaptation engine (route planning, behavioral layer,
motion planning) and an adaptable layer (local feedback control).
e scenario consists of tasks associated with the vehicles and with
target destinations for an area dened by a map. Based on this
information, the adaptation engine computes the feasible route and
the velocities along this route.
During the car ride, the adaptation layer provides a xed-length
planning horizon from the pre-computed route. is planning
horizon τ contains a set of directions and a set of velocities along
this path (Figure 3, le). e adaptable layer uses this information to
compute the steering angle (directions) and the velocity. Whenever
the vehicle passes the rst vector of the planning horizon, a new
horizon is provided by the adaptable layer.
e adaptable layer senses the current location (p), velocity (®v),
and orientation (®o) from the environment (Figure 3, right). is
information is reported back to the adaptation layer and used there
as a source for the next planning horizon. It could, for example,
reect this information when necessary if the vehicle is too far
from a planned position.
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Figure 2: Decision-making hierarchy used in self-driving
cars according to [45] and the self-adaptation focused archi-
tecture
e central part of the adaptable layer is the control algorithm,
which computes the set of values for a steering angle (θ ) of an
Ackermann-steering and the wheel rotation speed (ω) of the front
wheels. e computation is based on the provided path τ from the
planning horizon and the corresponding velocities in addition to p,
®v , and ®o from the environment.
We dene the input for the adaptable layer from the adaptation
layer as follows (see Figure 3, le): Inadt = {τ0, ..,τn } with τi =
{ts0, .., tsm } the ith planning horizon for the adaptable layer. An
element in a planning horizon τi is dened by tsj = (psj ,vsj ) with
psj as a point on the street to be passed and vsj the set-velocity
for this point. Elements have a xed distance d to each other, so
that: ∀j : |psj − psj−1 | = d . e input from the environment to the
adaptable layer and to the adaptation engine is dened in this way
(Figure 3, right): Inenv = e0, . . . , en with ei = ( ®pei , ®vei , ®oei ), ®pei
the current position, ®vei the current velocity and ®oei the current
orientation of the vehicle.
In our approach, we target the adaptable layer with testing. e
input space for the operational prole is, therefore, the input from
the adaptation layer Inadt and the environment Inenv .
2.2 Scenario
Our scenario starts when the rst risk estimations of the vehicle
are carried out, which happens at system development-time. If this
estimated risk is below a dened upper bound, the system will be
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Figure 3: Adaptation engine and environment input
released for deployment. Aer deployment, the adaptable layer is
not in itself changed anymore. New soware versions will require
a new run of our approach.
e vehicles will rst be deployed in the city from which the risk
assessment team assumed an operational prole for release testing.
An operational prole consists of a discrete probability density
function over the binned input space (Inadt ∩ Inenv ). Intuitively,
this function describes the likelihood that any set of inputs within
a bin will be selected when the autonomous vehicle is used in the
city streets.
While driving, data from all deployed vehicles is transferred to the
manufacturer, where the previously estimated operational prole is
updated. Alongside the operational prole, the risk estimates will
be updated as well. If necessary, additional tests will be allocated
to lower the risk.
Aer a while, vehicles start to get deployed in new and yet unknown
cities. Up to this point, the operational prole converged only to
the operational prole of the original location of deployment. In the
new deployment environment, it is expected that the current prole
will have to be updated. is change in the operational prole will
entail further re-estimations of risk and possibly further tests. In
our scenario we will consider dierent strategies for deciding when
and how many additional tests might be necessary.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, preliminaries are briey summarized, and we estab-
lish some basic terminology.
3.1 Soware Reliability Testing
Soware reliability [33] and the more traditional term of reliability
connected to hardware have been recognized as something very
dierent already starting from 1970. In [6], for example, soware
reliability is characterized by the relation between failures that
always exist in soware and the usage of soware according to
an operational prole. Unsurprisingly the partitioning of an input
space (the operational prole as subdomains) together with a prob-
ability distribution for the prole is necessary for test allocation.
Soware Reliability Testing is also known as Statistical Soware
Testing.
Based on the 2016 update of the IEEE 1633 standard [40], we
dened our process for soware reliability testing in four activities:
(1) build a set of statistical models to predict the reliability risk, (2)
update the models to reect changes in the operational environment,
(3) perform sensitivity analysis to identify the subdomains in the
operational prole that are more sensitive to change, and (4), based
on that, allocate additional tests to minimize increases in risk.
Most of the soware reliability testing techniques rely on a history
of test failures (e.g., growth models) [34][1], usage information
(operational prole) [36], or a combination of the both [62]. Since
we aim to estimate risk even in the absence of failures, we do not
rely on a history of failures. Conversely, our models are based
solely on the distribution of usage and tests across the operational
prole subdomains.
We termed the soware inputs as demands, which have an asso-
ciated probability of failing for a demand (probability of failure on
demand or short p f d , [32]). In order to compute p f d , a soware
is tested with inputs according to the operational prole. Even if
these tests do not reveal failures, an estimate of p f d can be made
based on a Bayesian model [36].
e idea is to get an estimate of p f d and combine that with the
operational prole. e operational prole is denoted by a discrete
probability distribution P = {p1, . . . ,pn } over the subdomains (or
bins in statistical terminology). In our example, the subdomains
are derived over the input space of Inadt ∩ Inenv . p f d is computed
with the Laplace Rule of Succession: p f d = 12+t , where t denotes
the number of successful tests. When applied to the subdomains,
the overall reliability estimate becomes: p f d =
∑n
i pi
1
2+ti with ti
the number of tests applied to each subdomain.
3.2 Statistical Soware Testing for Risk
Analysis
As outlined in detail by Gardiner in [22], SST can also be employed
for risk analysis to help estimating risk. erefore, it is suggested
to identify demands as specically critical scenarios such as, for
example, the occurrences of a tire blowout as a demand e and then
estimate the likelihood of such a demand by λe , the severity of
an accident in case of such a demand as ϵe , and estimate the like-
lihood of the occurrence of the demand e employing statistical
soware testing employing a dedicated environment simulation by
p f de = 1/(2 + te ) for te the number of tests assuming that all tests
where showing no accident. As outlined by Gardiner in [22, p. 164],
statistical soware testing without failures can also be employed
for risk analysis. It is suggested to identify a particular critical
scenario e and the likelihood of this critical scenario λe . We also
associate a value ϵe , which reects the hazard caused by e in case
the system fails for this critical scenario. Based on our example, a
tire-blowout could be a situation for which the autonomous vehicle
is required to react in a way that does not cause harm.
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Given a set H of all critical scenarios,
risk(per demand) =
∑
e ∈H
p f deλeϵe (1)
results in the estimate of the current risk. All tests for this estima-
tion are carried out in an environment where critical scenarios can
be simulated. Because the analysis of risk requires the inclusion of
hazard ϵe , we no longer depend only on the occurrence distribution
of λ, but also on the severity distribution ϵ . On the other hand, any
operational prole that is orthogonal to the occurrence of a hazard
scenario will be omied to reect the assumption of a steady-state
required for this approach of testing.
4 APPROACH
Our approach combines Bayesian modeling of statistical soware
testing for risk analysis with the monitoring of an operational
prole, as detailed in Subsection 4.1. In Subsection 4.2, we describe
how we update our prior knowledge of the operational prole that
reects a change in the environment. In Subsection 4.3, we explain
how updates in the prole aect the estimates of upper-bound risk.
We present three dierent strategies that either (1) keep risk at the
same level with possibly innite additional tests, (2) lower the risk
continuously by testing with a xed number of tests, (3) or combine
both approaches (see Figure 4).
4.1 Statistical Soware Testing for Risk
Analysis for Operational Proles
To employ statistical soware testing for risk analysis [22], as intro-
duced in Section 3.2, we adjusted the seing to avoid the unreason-
able strong assumption of a steady-state of the system. Instead, the
operational proles p1, . . . ,pn over the equivalence classes (sub-
domains) I with |I | = n are used to allocate the test eort so that
the occurrences of a demand are tested for each of the equivalence
classes. is can be done by adjusting Equation 1 accordingly.
risk(per demand) =
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I
p f deiλeϵe (2)
where p f dei is obtained as p f dei = (1/(2 + tei ))pi
If during development-time a required upper bound UB for an
estimated operational prole p1, . . . ,pn has to be ensured, we thus
will consider ∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I
1
2 + tei
piλeϵe ≤ UB, (3)
where we assume that pi ⊥ λe (independence). Moreover, tei have
to be found such that Equation 3 holds while the cost
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I tei
is minimized. Alternatively, if sucient resources for testing are
available such that m tests with m >
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I tei can be done,
it would be more appropriate to actually minimize the outcome of
Equation 3 by taking the cost limitm into account.
4.2 Operational Distributions at Run-Time
e distribution of an operational prole might not remain the same
aer deployment [39]. For this reason, the reliability engineering
practice recommends updating the operational distribution aer
deployment [40]. is is in line with the need to update the risk
estimates when the environment changes. For a single system,
this would result in monitoring the current state of the system by
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e current state of the operational prole is derived from the
occurrence counts O = {o1, . . . ,on }, where for each subdomain
(with |X | = ∑n1 xi ,X = {x1, . . . xn }):
P = { o1|O | , . . . ,
on
|O | } = {p1, . . . ,pn } (4)
e monitoring of updates U = {uo , . . . ,un } will simply be added
to the current occurrence counts, which will generate an updated
prole
P ′ = { o1 + u1|O | + |U | , . . . ,
on + un
|O | + |U | } = {p
′
1, . . . ,p
′
n } (5)
In the case of autonomous vehicles, we face the challenge of an
input space that is very large. is happens even if the subdomains
had been selected in an optimal way. As a consequence, the prole
would be updated slowly. However, autonomous vehicles are not
single instance systems. Instead, they are deployed on a large-scale
basis. is allows us to collect monitoring input from all running
system instances and update a centralized prole, similarly as it is
done with the single instance (Equation 5). e benet of updating
from multiple instances is the faster synchronization of the prole
with the reality of usage.
4.3 Statistical Soware Testing for Risk
Analysis at Run-Time
e extension introduced in Subsection 4.1 implies that the risk
dependency goes beyond the hazard scenario likelihood λe and the
severity ϵe . e risk also depends on the impact of changes in the
operational prole.
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Consequently, any change in the operational prole at run-time
will possibly result in a reduced accuracy of the risk that was as-
sessed during system development-time.
erefore, we propose to use the develop-time risk assessment as a
risk baseline, which we inherit and work to minimize at run-time.
is results in three strategies: (1) maintenance of a required upper
bound for the risk (Figure 4 le) and (2) steering the testing eorts
while the system is operating, such that the lowest possible upper
bound for the risk can be established (Figure 4 middle and right).
(3) combination of (1) and (2) (Figure 4 right).
4.3.1 Maintaining Required Upper Bounds for Risk at Run-Time.
Given an updated operational prole P ′ we have to ensure that∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I
1
2 + t ′ei
p′iλeϵe ≤ UB, (6)
with t ′ei ≥ tei by running
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I t ′ei − tei additional tests
while the system is operating. Equation 6 can at rst be used to
check whether there is at all the need to do additional tests (see
”computeRisk(op’,tests) > UpperBound” from Algorithm 1).
If the operational distribution evolves towards the direction that
the statistical testing could aain the required upper bound for
the risk with fewer tests, then we do not need additional tests.
Otherwise, it would be necessary to do additional tests to ensure
that the upper bound still holds. is implies nding t ′ei such that
Equation 6 holds while the cost
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I t ′ei − tei is minimized
(see ”computeReqAddTests(op’,tests)” from Algorithm 1).
1 op’ := monitorOperationalProle();
2 if computeRisk(op’,tests) ¿ UpperBound then
3 tests’ := computeReqAddTests(op’,tests);
4 executeAddTest(tests’);
5 op := op’;
6 tests := tests ∪ tests’;
7 end
Algorithm 1: Strategy 1, maintaining upper bound
4.3.2 Minimize Upper Bounds for Risk at Run-Time. Assuming
xed resources for testing while the system is running, allows to
dom additional tests. Hence, the task becomes to minimize risk for
the operational prole that have evolved from P to P ′
min
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I
1
2 + tˆei
p′iλeϵe , (7)
respecting that the additional costs
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I tˆei − tei must be
bound tom (see ”computeOptAddTests(op’,tests,m);” in Algo-
rithm 2).
1 op’ := monitorOperationalProle();
2 tests’ := computeOptAddTests(op’, tests, m);
3 executeAddTest(tests’);
4 op := op’;
5 tests := tests ∪ tests’;
Algorithm 2: Strategy 2, minimize risk with additional tests
4.3.3 Maintaining andMinimizing Risk at Run-Time. Minimizing
Equation 7 will not always guarantee that Equation 6 still holds
for an upper boundUB. In this case, we suggest a combination of
both strategies. Here, minimization can only be considered if for
all e ∈ H and i ∈ I we have tˆei ≥ t ′ei (see Algorithm 3).
1 op’ := monitorOperationalProle();
2 tests” := computeOptAddTests(op’, tests, m);
3 tests := tests ∪ tests’;
4 if computeRisk(op’,tests) ¿ UpperBound then
5 tests” := computeReqAddTests(op’,tests);
6 executeAddTest(tests” ∪ tests’);
7 tests := tests ∪ tests”;
8 end
9 op := op’;
Algorithm 3: Strategy 3, combined strategy
5 UPPER BOUND MINIMIZATION OR TEST
RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION
We have established two optimization problems relevant to our
approach: (1) Given an upper bound UB on risk per demand, min-
imize the sum of tests so that risk per demand lies beneath the
upper bound (minimize
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I tie in Equation 3) and (2) given
a xed sum of tests, nd a distribution of tests to minimize risk per
demand (minimize risk(perdemand) in Equation 2).
A general solution to these minimization problems then applies
to oine risk analysis as described in Section 4.1. From this we also
derive solutions for the strategies applied at runtime (Section 4.3).
5.1 Minimizing Tests Given an Upper Bound
on Risk
Solving this optimization problem requires minimizing the objective
function
T =
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I
tie (sum of tests)
for tie ≥ 0 and under the inequality constraint∑
e ∈H
(
λeϵe
∑
i ∈I
pi
2 + tie
)
≤ UB (risk per demand)
given an upper bound UB on risk per demand. We can nd a
real-valued solution by constructing the problem generalized as
a Lagrange function and using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. Since both the objective function and the inequality
constraint (for tie > −2) are convex, checking satisfaction of the
KKT conditions is fairly straightforward, and the solution is indeed
a global minimum (again, given tie > −2). We get
tie =
√
λeϵepi
UB
©­«
∑
j ∈H
√
λjϵj
ª®¬
(∑
k ∈I
√
pk
)
− 2 (8)
and a corresponding lower bound on the number of tests
T ≥ 1
UB
(∑
e ∈H
√
λeϵe
)2 (∑
i ∈I
√
pi
)2
− 2 |H | |I | . (9)
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However, we need integer test numbers – and this solution is
real-valued. Also, while Equation 8 ensures that values tie will
be greater than −2, they can be negative. Although this will only
happen if UB is large in relation to values λe , ϵe , pi , and the sums
of Equation 8.
We propose to solve both problems as follows: aer determining
the optimal real-valued solution, we go through all values tie in
an iterative fashion, rounding up or down with a minimum of 0
as needed. When values are rounded up (which is the default),
the corresponding decrease in risk is accumulated. Whenever the
increase in risk from rounding down a value would be lower than
the accumulated decrease in risk, we will round the value down
instead and subtract the increase in risk from the accumulated
decrease.
We could also choose the naive solution of rounding up all values
tie to the next integer, with a minimum of 0. is will lead to a
worse result with respect to the number of tests; however, simply
rounding up all values can be done while computing the real-valued
solution, and all values tie can be computed in parallel if desired.
For the strategy above, dependencies between values are likely to
make parallel execution more challenging and less eective.
5.2 Minimizing Risk Given a Fixed Sum of
Tests
To solve this optimization problem, we switch the objective function
and constraint from before. We need to minimize
R =
∑
e ∈H
(
λeϵe
∑
i ∈I
pi
2 + tie
)
(risk per demand)
for tie ≥ 0 and under the equality constraint
T =
∑
e ∈H
∑
i ∈I
tie (sum of tests)
given a sum of testsT . Since we have an equality constraint instead
of an inequality constraint, this problem is easier to solve. We do
not need the KKT conditions, only the problem’s Lagrange function
and its partial derivatives. Again, the functions are convex for
tie > −2. We get
tie =
√
λeϵepi (T + 2 |H | |I |)(∑
j ∈H
√
λjϵj
) (∑
k ∈I
√
pk
) − 2 (10)
and a resulting lower bound on risk per demand of
R ≥
(∑
e ∈H
√
λeϵe
)2 (∑
i ∈I
√
pi
)2
T + 2 |H | |I | , (11)
which, unsurprisingly, is equivalent to a rearranged Equation 9
when R is substituted for UB.
As before, this is a real-valued solution, and values tie may lie
between −2 and 0 for a comparatively low number of tests T . Also,
we cannot simply round up values tie because their sum might then
exceed T . Instead, we can round down values, starting with the
lowest value tie , and accumulate the sum of values thusly subtracted
(by rounding). Whenever the sum exceeds or equals the dierence
required to round up the next value tie , we round up instead and
subtract the dierence from the accumulated sum. Negative values
are set to 0 – and if the accumulated sum falls below 0, this can
be compensated with the next value(s). is process leaves the
sum T of tests unchanged. While it does not necessarily result
in the optimal (integer) solution with respect to risk, it brings us
reasonably close (cf. Section 6) to the lower bound on risk per
demand (Equation 11).
5.3 Optimization for Prole Change
For risk analysis at run-time, we need extensions of the previous
optimization problems, in order to incorporate the knowledge of
pre-existing tests. e computation of required additional tests
(strategy 1) needs a minimization for a given upper bound and
pre-existing tests. A steady number of additional tests per time
(strategy 2) asks for a minimization of risk given a number of tests
and pre-existing tests. Finally, a steady number of additional tests
together with more tests when needed (strategy 3) is covered by a
combination of the solutions of the other optimization problems.
5.3.1 Minimizing Tests. e objective is to nd the minimal
number of additional tests required if an upper bound should be
kept, based on an existing distribution of tests. Since we do not need
additional tests for bins (subdomains) where the probability has
dropped, we rst compute the risk value for all those bins. Given
I ′ = {i | p′i ≤ pi } as the set of the respective indices, we have
Rcov =
∑
e ∈H
(
λeϵe
∑
i ∈I ′
p′i
2 + tie
)
. (12)
For the remaining bins, where the new p′i are more likely than the
old pi , we rst compute new intermediate t∗ie for i ∈ I \ I ′, taking
the calculated risk value Rcov into account:
t∗ie =
√
λeϵep
′
i
UB − Rcov
©­«
∑
j ∈H
√
λjϵj
ª®¬ ©­«
∑
k ∈I\I ′
√
p′k
ª®¬ − 2 (13)
In a nal step, we bring the newly obtained and the old tests together
t ′ie =
{
0 ,p′i ≤ pi
t∗ie − tie ,p′i > pi
(14)
to nd the number of testing that needs to be done in addition.
5.3.2 Minimizing Risk. We want to nd the distribution of new
tests for a given numberm, which minimizes risk when there are
already tests. e idea is similar to the previous case. Improvements
can only be achieved for bins with new p′i , which are more likely
than old pi . Given I ′ = {i | p′i ≤ pi } as before, we compute new
values t∗ie for i ∈ I \ I ′:
t∗ie =
√
λeϵep
′
i (m + 2 |H | |I \ I ′ |)(∑
j ∈H
√
λjϵj
) (∑
k ∈I\I ′
√
p′k
) − 2 (15)
Consequently, we distribute new tests only between these bins
t ′ie =
{
0 ,p′i ≤ pi
t∗ie ,p
′
i > pi
(16)
and set all other to zero.
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Figure 5: 3d physics simulation of our scenario
20 34
0
66
0
98
0
13
00
16
20
19
40
22
60
25
80
29
00
32
20
35
40
38
60
41
80
45
00
48
20
51
40
54
60
57
80
61
00
64
20
67
40
70
60
73
80
77
00
80
20
83
40
86
60
89
80
93
00
96
20
99
40
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
samples added c1 samples added c2
cycle of sampling
nr
 o
f s
am
pl
es
 a
dd
ed
Figure 6: Prole sampling
6 EVALUATION
For our evaluation, we implemented the scenario described in Sec-
tion 2 inside a 3D physics simulation environment (see Figure 5
and appendix A). is enabled us to evaluate our approach without
an actual eet of vehicles. e simulation environment showed
how risk is aected when our approach is not applied (uncontrolled
risk with only deployment time tests) versus the application of the
dierent strategies (controlled risk).
6.1 Setup
We started our case study with an operational prole estimate based
on one city. As a critical scenario, we assumed the aforementioned
tire blowout. An estimate for λ is based on a eld study in [49] that
observed a tire blowout once in driving 16,278 kilometers and only
because of an accident. erefore, we assumed a λe ≤ 116,278∗200 .
e product of the inequality is the result of 200 planning steps
(demands) per kilometer in our example. e severity ϵe was set
to 1. e subdomains where chosen as described in the appendix
with 200 bins. We set the risk upper bound value to 1.0e − 4, which
in a real seing is determined according to domain knowledge of
specic safety requirement levels.
We emulated our environment change by a transition of sampling
from two dierent data sources (two cities), as shown in Figure
6. is resulted in a change in prole (approximated by the area
between proles) from the initial distribution over time, as depicted
in Figure 7. e x-axis represents a sequence of cycles with a
growing number of operational prole samples.
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per bound with strategy 1.
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bound with strategy 1
6.2 Ensuring an Upper Bound
Based on the strategy for maintaining the upper bound, we were
able to keep the upper bound below the required level (omied
because it is a simple line). e necessary tests that were allocated
each cycle are shown in Figure 8. As expected, for the small uctu-
ations in the prole during the deployment in only one city, almost
no additional tests are necessary. But as soon as the sampling en-
forces a change in the prole, tests become necessary to mitigate
the change regarding risk. In a later phase, when the prole is
approaching a new steady-state, testing becomes less of a need
again. In Figure 9 we see the total number of tests, which shows
similarity in shape to the change in prole.
6.3 Continuous Addition of Tests
Risk predictions grow increasingly divergent when transitioning
from the rst to the second city (see Figure 10). is divergence is
solely originated by the uncontrolled risk (red line) as the controlled
risk (blue line) rst uctuates below the risk upper-bound but nally
breaks through. is is accomplished by a fraction of initial tests, i.e.,
adding 200 on top of the 1.8 million tests (0.01%). While this would
be expected for a safety-critical system that was thoroughly tested
7
20 32
0
62
0
92
0
12
20
15
20
18
20
21
20
24
20
27
20
30
20
33
20
36
20
39
20
42
20
45
20
48
20
51
20
54
20
57
20
60
20
63
20
66
20
69
20
72
20
75
20
78
20
81
20
84
20
87
20
90
20
93
20
96
20
99
20
9.80E-05
9.90E-05
1.00E-04
1.01E-04
1.02E-04
1.03E-04
1.04E-04
1.05E-04
1.06E-04
risk with strategy 2 risk with no added tests
cycle of sampling
ris
k 
es
tim
at
e
upper bound
Figure 10: Risk for constantly adding tests with strategy 2
and risk without additional tests
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Figure 11: Risk if adding tests constantly while ensuring the
upper bound with strategy 3
before the rst deployment, these results suggest two interesting
reections: (1) how ne-grained the feedback control actuation is
to keep the risk below the upper-bound and (2) how important is
to have guidance on where to allocate these few tests among the
various equivalence classes.
6.4 Continuous Addition of Tests while
Ensuring the Upper Bound
In the previous case, we could continue adding tests to keep the
risk below the upper bound. Nonetheless, we still need a way to
overcome the situations where the number of tests planned in a
cycle might not be enough.
We investigated this situation with the third strategy that com-
bines the previous two strategies. e results of this combined
strategy are shown in Figure 11. Comparing the blue curves from
Figure 11 with Figure 10, we can see that strategy 3 provides two
forms of improvements: (1) it kept the risk curve at a lower level
than strategy 2 and (2) it corrected for risk more strongly for the
cycles where the risk started to increase more quickly. ese im-
provements stem from continuously adding tests (strategy 1) while
still estimating the need for additional tests (strategy 2).
Ultimately, our evaluation illustrated the diculty of keeping an
autonomous safety-critical system operating below a risk upper
bound. e outcomes of the three strategies provide an intuition of
this diculty.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
External validity discusses the situations for which the research
assumptions and outcomes might not generalize to a dierent but
relevant seing [60]. One generalizability threat is how represen-
tative are dierences between the testing and usage proles. To
mitigate this threat, we selected two cities with distinct street pat-
terns that have an eect on the driving prole (speed, direction).
Another relevant threat related to how representative the dataset
is of real-world self-driving data. We mitigated this threat by de-
signing a data generation process that can be parameterized to
various particular self-driving situations. Although we used two
distinct cities, the evaluation showed that even small topological
dierences already impose a challenge for test allocation. A third
threat lies in the limitation on a xed number of subdomains in a
xed input space. One might argue that this prevents us from deal-
ing with unforeseen events because these would represent a new
subdomain/bin where tests could be allocated to. We avoided this
issue by trading state space size for data sparsity. e consequence
is that the unforeseen events in our model correspond to bins with
zero counts, i.e., almost zero probability of occurrence (as pointed
out in Section 4.2).
Internal validity is the most common validity concern [52], and
it evaluates if evidences of our experimental interventions were
the necessary causes of the observed eects. We assumed that
the data points (bins) are i.i.d., which might not always be true.
e consequence is that in the worst-case scenario with dependent
bins, the outcome would be a higher than expected risk measure,
meaning more tests than we actually estimated for certain bins.
We deemed the risk of non i.i.d. bins to be small, but we plan to
address this situation in future work. Another validity situation
is that any increase in the number of tests per equivalence class
can only positively aect reliability. We avoided this threat by
stating the assumption of equal probability of failure for each input
within each class and that tests have no side-eects in the system.
However, these internal validity assumptions also depend on the
validity of the measurements [57], which we discuss next.
Construct validity concerns the situations for which the opera-
tional indicators do not measure the actual concepts (constructs).
is might happen through bias in the denitions, operations, and
methods [59] applied to the constructs. Two of our constructs are
the most sensitive to biases: reliability and risk. e reason is that
we do not measure them directly, instead we derived them from
other directly measured constructs. We mitigated this threat by
formalizing all the equations and procedures to compute reliability
and risk.
Conclusion validity concerns the situations for which there are
violations in the assumptions of the statistical methods that we
adopted. e most relevant situations are the choices of the like-
lihood (data generation process) and the prior (density of tests).
Wrong choices might bias the approximation of the posterior dis-
tribution of the risks over the equivalence classes. We mitigate
this threat by relying on principles of statistical test methods [22]
and taking a conservative approach by assuming an uninformative
prior, e.g., the Beta(1, 1) distribution.
8 RELATEDWORK - TESTING FOR
RELIABILITY
Testing for soware reliability, as we presented in this paper, holds
similarities with methods for testing self-adaptive systems and
self-driving cars.
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8.1 Testing Self-Adaptive Systems - SAS
Testing SAS at run time is used to provide assurance that the system
will behave as designed [14]. is is particularly dicult for SAS
because of the uncertainties about the impacts of system recong-
urations or environment changes [23], which are all inherent to
the unanticipated operational scenarios [5]. Hence, solutions for
testing SAS focus on mitigating dierent types of uncertainty in
the models of the system and the environment.
System model uncertainties involve the types of failures that
might happen and their impact at runtime. Online testing for SAS
was proposed as a means to anticipate failures and trigger adap-
tation when corresponding tests fail [26]. Although the failures
could be a measure of reliability, online testing is still dependent on
a complete knowledge of the operational scenario, which our ap-
proach precludes. Regarding uncertainties that lead to a degraded
operation, Camara et al. [8] investigated the resilience of SAS with
respect to changes in the execution load or the partial failure of
a system controller. Our approach is complementary as it allows
these types of robustness tests to be allocated at runtime.
Environment model uncertainty. Reichstaller et al. [50] investi-
gated a reinforcement learning approach to identify the priority of
tests, which were modeled as policies (action state pairs) to max-
imize a given risk-based reward function. Besides the challenge
in determining the reward function, their approach requires ne-
grained state-level data that might not be available in the sparse
operating environment of a SAS. Environmental uncertainties were
also mitigated by adaptive testing techniques [20]. Our approach
extends these techniques by adding reliability testing models.
Chen et al. [10] mitigated both system and environmental un-
certainties by means of a knowledge-base that formally species
operational states, action sequences (trajectories), and correspond-
ing constraints. We believe such a knowledge-base, particularly the
operational trajectories, could be used as a prior in tailoring our
clustering approach to a particular system-environment congura-
tion.
8.2 Testing Self-Driving Cars
e reliability and safety of autonomous vehicles are among the
main topics listed by members of academia and industry [28, 30].
Testing these systems involve novel types of uncertainties with
respect to (1) internal behavior of systems with blackbox and sto-
chastic machine learning models [30], (2) the lack of data on rare
or low-frequency events [29], and (3) missing or compromised data
acquired online over large geographical regions [28].
Testing Machine Learning Models. Burton et al. [7] proposed a
notation-based approach to identify and mitigate uncertainties in
the learned behavior of a machine learning model, e.g., insucient
training data, under-representative testing data, and diculty to
explain blackbox implementations. Machine learning models were
also used to mitigate the uncertainty of the complex behavior that
has to be learned. Wolf et al. [61] investigated a reinforcement
learning approach to learn the maneuver decisions while adopting
a compact semantic state representation and ensuring a consistent
model of the environment across scenarios.
Although the concerns of testing machine learning models seem
orthogonal to reliability testing, we assume that the initial tests
cover the critical behaviors of the autonomous vehicles. Otherwise
reliability estimates would be compromised by a defected product.
Rare-Event Testing. Low-Hutchinson et al. [27] developed a plat-
form that mitigates the uncertainty of rare events by automatically
generating tests. eir approach combines a data dictionary with
safety invariant denitions and mutations of live data. Our ap-
proach is complementary in the sense that it could be integrated
into their platform to prioritize test execution. Rare events were
also obtained via simulation and used to test autonomous vehi-
cles for scalability [43]. Our approach can be complemented with
more specic types of simulations, for instance, for stress testing
the impact of catastrophic events as bridge collapses or ooded
motorways.
Data Acquisition. Regardless of the frequency of events, one
still cannot ascertain when the new data of a eet of autonomous
vehicles will be available or even if the data could be trusted. is
problem has been partially addressed by on-demand approaches
like data synchronization methods [21] and the Tesla over-the-air
updates, which is still vulnerable to data hacking [41].
Ultimately, if we compare with the design of SAS, research
on testing these systems is still lacking [5, 54]. As pointed out
by Chechik et al. [9], safety standards like DO-178C (aerospace)
and ISO 262622 (automotive) provide recommendations on testing.
However, they still lack the details of how to compose partial evi-
dence of testing or how to use the results of one analysis to support
the other. ese are gaps that we expect that our work could help
bridge.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We developed a risk model based on the probability of occurrence
and a corresponding hazard. e risk model combines a system-
atic identication of equivalence classes and the statistical testing
of these classes. We built a simulation environment and a set of
statistical models to compute the probability of distinct classes of
hazardous scenarios (accidents).
Our contributions were three-fold. A method for collecting and
clustering multi-vehicle operational scenarios (driving trajectories)
to mitigate the data sparsity. Statistical models that estimate the risk
of accidents in a new trac environment. A feedback control-loop
model that actively minimizes the increase in the risk of accidents
by allocating test appropriately.
e results were promising in a sense that we were able to mea-
sure and control risk for a diversity of operational scenarios ob-
tained from two real cities with distinct street paerns. To allow
the reproduction of our results, we made the procedures, models,
and data publicly available to the community [24].
Our future work will incorporate the uncertainties in the en-
vironment model and the runtime model [23], e.g., street repairs,
time-of-day trac changes (school pick up times), and distinct types
of vehicles (taxis, trucks and delivery robots). is might require
the combination of synthetic operational data with real and manip-
ulated data, which in turn would allow us to evaluate which tactics
can eectively reduce these uncertainties [37]. On the epistemic
perspective, we also plan to study a more principled methodology
for partitioning the operational prole. is is necessary to sustain
the evolution of the context (user expectations), which many times
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Figure 12: Scenario maps: Chandigarh and Luebeck
happens in reaction [31] to the adaptation goals and behaviors of
the new autonomous system.
We would also like to extend our approach to cover dierent
monitoring strategies when updating the operational prole. Be-
cause the age of prole data has a relation with how much it adds
to the ”true” current prole, our approach could benet from strate-
gies that take data age importance into account (like [46]). Another
relevant issue in this context is the number of changes in the envi-
ronment and from the adaptation layer.
10 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
e authors would like to thank the Hasso-Planer Institute and
its Research School for the funding provided.
A APPENDIX
To generate the self-driving data in a way that it is reproducible
and realistic, we developed a simulation of a self-driving car that
can be deployed in dierent cities.
Scenario Realization. In this simulation, a vehicle is driving in a
static environment. Multiple vehicles are simulated sequentially. To
simulate a changing environment, we used two areas that provide
distinct characteristics with regard to their road layout (Luebeck
in Germany and Chandigarh in India, see Figure 12 and [47]). We
simulate the continuous change in the environment by combining
dierent percentages of the data for a virtual collection window,
from which we derive the operational distribution.
Regarding the adaptation engine, we designed it to continuously
change the parameter set for the velocity planning according to the
current environment. ese parameters consist of maximal values
for velocity, lateral acceleration, and longitudinal acceleration and
de-acceleration.
Implementation and Data Setup. e physical simulation is based
on the V-Rep experimentation platform (see [51]) together with
Figure 13: Visualization for the clustering with respect to τ
for part of the data
the ODE-Simulator (see [55]). We based our denition of physical
parameters of the vehicle on top of the standard Ackermann steer-
ing example shipped with the V-Rep platform. With respect to the
control of the vehicle in the simulator, we implemented both the
adaptation engine and the adaptable layer in Java language. e
control part of the adaptable layer implements a pure pursuit con-
trol algorithm with variable look-ahead distance (see [45], Section
V.A.1)). e areas are imported via SUMO from OpenStreetMap,
resulting in navigable maps ([2] [44]). e adaptation engine uses
the map to compute a path via a simple Dijkstra shortest path
implementation [15] for a given target from the vehicle’s current
location.
Destinations for the vehicle are provided by a Java process, which
also collects the data from the vehicles and stores them in a database.
A list of predened locations is randomly accessed and used as
targets for the vehicle. While the vehicle is driving, it reports every
planning horizon τt to the adapted layer and timely aligned to it
an input from the environment et = (pet , ®vet , ®oet ), with t the time
of collection. When storing τt and et in the database, timestamps t
from the simulator are stored as well.
Ground Truth. e vehicles drove more than 6334 kilometers
in the simulated cities. Based on the collected (τ , e) data, we built
a classication via k-means clustering (Figure 13). Counting the
(τ , e) in the clustering provided the ground truth assumption for
the ”true” operational prole of the cities.
Environment Change Simulation by Sampling. We derived a change
in the environment by using data from two dierent maps. We col-
lected ground truth prolespGli for a map of the city of Luebeck and
pGci for a map of the city of Chandigarh. In our scenario, vehicles
are rst deployed in the city of Luebeck and then in Chandigarh. An
extension of the deployed vehicles environment from Luebeck to
Chandigarh from an operational prole point of view is the average
of pGli and p
Gc
i . If (τ , e) are reported by the deployed vehicles at
run-time, and a prole is incrementally built, we expect the overall
monitored operational prole to be initially close topGli and aer an
innite number of time to approximate the average of pGli and p
Gc
i .
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We simulated this eect by incrementally sampling (τ , e) elements
that were collected while building pGli and p
Gc
i in a changing ratio.
More specically, for a given time t , pi (t) is based on n samples for
which the likelihood of being from Luebeck is (1 − r (t)) and r (t)
from Chandigarh with r : T → [0, 0.5] and r (0) = 0.
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